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In the Supreme Court of
The State of Utah
GENERAL TALKING PICTURES CORP'ORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
NAIDA L. HYATT, as Executrix of the Est~te of CIVIL
E. H. Littlejohn, who is the same person as Elsie No. 7170
Haas Littlejohn, and JAMES COCHRAN LIT-I
TLEJOHN, as administrator with will annexed ofj ·
the Estate of William Littlejohn, deceased,
Defendants.

CR.espondent's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents agree that the statement of facts contained in the appellant's brief is substantially correct.
The company is the plaintiff in this action. The "Exhibitor" refers to E. H. Littlejohn and William Littlejojhn,
both deceased, who died on the 8th day of May, 1942, and
the 14th day of June, 1944, respectively.
For convenience appellant will hereinafter be referred
to as plaintiff, and respondents as defendants, and E·. H.
Littlejohn and William Littlejohn as decedents.
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FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in finding
that plaintiff's claim as presented to the defendants was
not accompanied by a copy of the written Agreement upon
which the claim was founded, or that such copy was not
presented with said claim. (Finding No. 14; J.R. p. 47 & 48)
that plaintiff should be sustained in its contention because
it alleged that the claim was "duly presented" (J. R. p~ 2;
par. 12), and that nowhere is that allegation denied, but
that on the contrary, the defendants admit in thedr
Amended Answer to par. 12 of plaintiff's Complaint "that
the plaintiff presented to each a purported claim in said
estates." (J. R. p. 24).
We cannot agree with the plaintiff's argument to the
effect that when plaintiff alleged that a cl~im was "duly
presented" in each of said estates, it in effect alleged that a
copy of the Agreement upon which the claim was based
was attached to the claim as presented. Plaintiff agrees
that a claim based upon a written instrument to be regularly presented, must be accompanied by a copy of-such instrument, but counsel for plaintiff take the position that
the word "duly" implies "the existence of ·every fact essen..
tial to perfect regularity of procedure." (19 C. J.p. 833).
D·efendants d~nied generally and specifically that said
claim was "duly" presented. In par. 10 of their Amended
Answer (J. R. p. 24), the defendants admit only that the
plaintiff presented to each of them a purported claim in
said. estates. Defendants did not admit that plaintiff "duly"
presented said claim. D·efendants, in their Amended Answer, denied specifically and generally each and every allegation in said par. 12 contained, not therein specifically
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admitted or denied. (J. R. p. 24). Since defendants admit
only the presentation of a "purported claim," and not that
it was "duly" presented, and since the other allegations in
said paragraph were denied, the defendants denied that said
claim \vas "duly" presented.·
After evidence duly presented, the court found that
the plaintiff presented its claims "but did not accompany or
present with said claims, or either of them, a copy of the
written Agreement upon which the same was and is founded
or based." (J. R. p. 48).
Section 102-9-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides,
among other things, that:

•

"all claims arising upon contract whether the same
are due, not due, or contingent, must be presented
within the time limited in the notice, and any
claim not presented is barred forever;-"
Section 102-9-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, on the
subject of the contents of a claim, provides, _among other
things, as follows :
"If the claim is founded on a bond, bill, note, or any
other instrument, a copy of such instrument must
acco:r_npany the claim,-"
·
The plaintiff did not make a prima facie case against
the defendants because of the deficiency in its claim in said
particular, and· the court has specifically found against the
plaintiff on the fact involved. The matter of a claim was
litigated in the lower court. The plaintiff cannot challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence because it has failed to bri~g
up the bill of exceptions in the case, and is therefore bound
by the finding of the court as made.
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However, even if the defentants had admitted that
said claims were "duly" presented, this would not aid the
plaintiff for the reason that in pleading, the word "duly"
imports but a conclusio"n relating only to the formalities
observed and non-observed and tenders no issue. (See 28
C. J. S. p. 586). (Emphasis ours.)
In Miles v McDermott, 31 Cal. 27 4, the court says :
''Such words as 'duly,' 'wrongfully,' and 'unlawfully' so frequently used in pleadings, might better be omitted. They tender no issue."
To the same effect see Going v. Dinwiddie, 86 Cal. 633,
25 P. 129. In Stott v. City of Chicago, ~ N. E. 736, a petition
for mandamus· to compel petitioner's restoration to the office
of police patrolman, alleged that petitioner was duly appointed to the office without alleging the passage of any
ordinance fixing the number of patrolmen or providing for
their appointment or election. The court held the allegation
that the petitioner was duly appointed to the office was insufficient as an allegation as to the manner of petitioner's
appointment, the allegation being a legal conclusion. (Emphasis is ours.)
Counsel for the plaintiff in his brief cites 19 C. J. p.
833 in support of his contention in this matter. He neglected
however to quote the following language from the very
citation above quoted and cited by plaintiff, to-wit:
"In pleading, the term imports but a conclusion
relating only to the formalities observed or nonobserved, and tenders no issue. While it does not
vitiate a pleading, it is surplusage, and had better
be omitted."
'
See Words and Phrases, First Series, Vol. 3, p. 2259 :
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''The word 'duly,' as used in an averment that plaintiff is
duly incorporated, imports but a conclusion . . ."
In a tax refund suit, an allegation that the refund
claim was "duly filed" was held merely a legal conclusion,
and for the purpose of demurrer, said words must be treated
as not showing when refund claim was filed. (James A.
Hearn & Son v. U. S., 8 Fed. Supp. 698, certiorari denied, 55
S. Ct. 550, 294 U. S. 722, 79 L. Ed. 1254.
It will be noted from all the authorities above cited that
the words "duly presented," or "duly filed" and phrases of
like import, are nothing but mere conclusions and tender no
issue. Certainly, it would be a strained construction, to say
the least, to hold that the words "duly presented" in this
case mean that the claim presented to each/estate herein
was accompanied by a copy of the written Agreement between the plaintiff and the decedents. However, we have
denied generally and specifically in our Amended Answer
that said claims were "duly" presented, even if such phrase
would permit such unwarranted meaning.
Plaintiff, on p. 6 of its brief, makes the claim that the
defendants "admitted that plaintiff duly presented a 'purported' claim." This is not true. There is no such language
in our Amended Answer, and our Amended Answer is not
subject to such construction. In fact our Answer does not
use the word "duly" at all in regard to said claim, but denies
specifically and generally the portion of the plaintiff's
Complaint in which it alleges that the claim was ''duly"
presented. (J. R. p. 24, par. 10.)
We are also unable to concur in plaintiff's assertion
that a purported claim is a sufficient and statutory claim,
nor can we agree with counsel that the cases cited on p. 6
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of his Brief sustain the proposition that a purported claim
is a sufficient and statutory claim. We have examined said
authorities cited on p. 6, and find that none of them sustain phiintiff's contention. Most of said cases simply construe statutes in which the word "purport" is used, and
the courts seem to adopt the definition of said word contained in Webster's N e\v International Dictionary to the
effect that ·said word means "To have the appearance or
convey the impression of being, meaning, or signifying some
particular thing; to mean or seem to mean or intend."
It will be noted that some of the cases cited are criminal
cases in which this word is construed, but we do not find
in said cases any ;.statement to the effect that a purported
claim is a sufficient and statutory claim, and none of said
cases are authority for the proposition which counsel contends for in this case.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Under this Assignment, plaintiff claims that the trial
court erred in making the following finding, to-wit: "that
more than six years prior to the commencement of this
action, the plaintiff elected to terminate, and did terminate
"
said Agreement . . ." (Finding No. 12; J. R. p. 46). Plain·tiff( complains that said purported finding is not a finding
of fact, but a conclusion of law. The writer of plaintiff's
Brief states that he has ,not been able to find any case
which has adjudicated this question with respect to the
word "termination" or "terminated." We wish to cite two
California cases wherein similar findings containing the
word "terminated" were h.eld to be findings of ultimate
fact and not conclusions of law. See Centrai Heights Im-
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pro_yement Co. v. Memorial Parks, Calif., 105 P. 2d 596. In
that case an action was brought to recover the unpaid purchase price alleged to be due under a contract for the sale
of realty for cemetery purposes. The defendant corporation alleged that its only contract with plaintiff changed
the terms of a previous agreement between the plaintiff
and the promoter. The trial court made a finding that
plaintiff's contract with the corporation "terminated and
cancelled" the prior contract. Held: This finding constituted
a finding of an ultimate fact and was within the issues presented by the pleadings.
See also Capital National Bank of Sacramento v. Smith,
144 P. 2d 665, 672 (Cal.) In this case the appeUant Barbara
de Bles challenged Finding No. 12 as a conclusion of law.
The court said :
"The challenged finding specifically determines
that the defendant Barbara de Bles defaulted in
petformance of the terms, covenants, and .conditions of the Smith-de Bles Agreement, and that
Smith terminated that contract on January 24,
1940, on that account; that all of the rights of said
defendant under the contract were thereby terminated, and that she thereafter held no assignable
or other interest in said property. Finding No. 12
is a sufficient determination of the ultimate facts
to the effect that the contract of Barbara de Bles,
dated September 27, 1936, was terminated for
breach of covenants to pay installments at specified times . . ."
We cite also: Nuttal v. Holman, (Utah) 173 P. 2d, 1015,
wherein the trial court made findings to the effect that the
plaintiff "abandoned" his contract. This court held the
findings were within the issues of the answ!er alleging that
plaintiff promised to pay the full purchase price on a
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specified day, and failed /to do so. We submit that there is
little difference betw,een a finding that plaintiff "abandoned" his contract and a finding that a plaintiff "elected to
terminate and did terminate" its agreement. We believe
that under the circumstances both findings are of ultimate
facts and are not conclusions of law.
Finally, we call the court's attention to the case of
Sandall v. Hoskins, 104 U. 50, 56; 137 P. 2d, 819, 822, wherein it is stated that the Supreme Court should not be technical in requiring a trial court to make refined separations betw~een findings of fact and conclusions of law, especially
where the basis for the so-called findings clearly appears in
the findings. See also Wright v. Lee, 104 U. 90; 138 P. 2d
246.
Plaintiff argues secondly· that the said finding is erronous for the reason that it i_s. outside the issues raised by the
pleadings, and that this is an affirative matter for the de-:
fendants to plead. The plaintiff is in court only on the
Judgment Roll. Evidence was introduced in the trial court
on the question pf termination, and said matter was specifically involved in the pleading of the statutes of limitations. The Reply of the plaintiff alleges that approximately
74 letters were written to the decedents, (J. R. p. 39) and
gives the dates thereof. The court found in part as follows:
\

"That in each of said letters plaintiff demanded
payment of the sum due it from the decedents
under paragraph 5A of the Agreement, and in
some of said letters the plaintiff demanded the
return of it by the decedents of said phonofilm
and equipment; that the dates of the letters in
which the plaintiff demanded of the decedents that
they return the said phonofilm and equipment to
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New York Citv are as follows- (dates given)."
(J. R. p. 47.) ~
We also wish to call the court's attention to the fact
that after the filing of the plaintiff's Reply alleging the
sending of all of said letters to the decedents, which said
Reply is dated May 10, 1946, (J. R. p. 40), the defendants
filed a "Supplement to Amended Answer of Naida L. Hyatt,
and Amended Answer of James Cochran Littlejohn" on May
14, 1946 (J. R. p. 37), in which the defendants plead the
bar of the statutes of limitations. This supplement pleads
that the plaintiff's alleged cause or causes of action, are
barred by the statutes of limitations (J. R. p. 37). All of
these matters, together with the evidence introduced, resulted in the court making the finding "that more than
six years prior to the commencement of this action~ the
plaintiff elected to terminate and did terminate said Agreement-" (Finding 12; J. R. p. 46).
The plaintiff's demands for the return of said equipment and its right to the same are involved in and connected
with the question of the tennination of the Agreement. The
plaintiff was not entitled to the return of the equipment
without its termination of the Agreement. The court has
made complete findings of fact on these matters. This court
is bound by said findings, appeal being only on the Judgment Roll.
Defendants contend that even if it were determined
that said finding is outside the issues raised by the pleadings, this objection is not available to the plaintiff for the
reason that the finding is amply supported by the evidence.
Since plaintiff brings this appeal upon the Judgment Roll
orily, and since the evidence is not before this court and
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cannot be considered by it, this Assignment is not available
to the pl~intiff. See Stephens v. Doxey, 62 Utah 241, 218 P.
965. In that case, the appellant complained that a certain
finding of the court was based on a matter outside the
pleadings, and hence was not made an issue in the case.
This court held that .appellant's objection was without
merit, where it was not asserted that the finding was without evidence to support it, or that such evidence was objected to. See also lVIoyle v. McKean, 49 Utah 93, 162, P. 63,
65, wherein this court held an assignment of error that a
finding was not, within the allegations of a complaint will be
overruled, where, though there were no allegations in the
comlaint in the precise form of the finding, it was fairly
within the purview ~f the allegations and responsive
thereto~

The authorities also appear to hold that even in the
absence of specific allegations of certain matters, if evidence is introduced on such matters, the court may make
a finding thereon. See Starkweather v. Eddy, (Cal.) 261, P.
763, which was an action for the recovery of money. The
complaint contained no specific allegations of fraud, but evidence of fraud was introduced. The California court held
in that case that the trial court could find on the question
of fraud, even though it was not alleged, since evidence was
introduced thereon.
The case of Taylor v. Taylor, 218 P. 756 (Calif.) is to
the effect that issues which arise from the evidence, and
which are not directly made by allegations in the pleadings
should be found upon.
It is our contention that the pleadings do raise the
issue of termination of the contract, but that in any event,
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evidence was introduced thereon, and the court was warranted in making the finding to which plaittiff objects.
And further, that appellant's objection is without merit,
because it has not and can not assert that the finding of the
court on this matter was without evidence to support it or
that the evidence introduced on the question was objected to
by appellant. It has appealed only on the judgment _roll.
The plaintiff in its brief states that it believes that
the case of Neuberger vs. Robbins, 37 Utah 197, 106 P. 933,
is absolutely "determinative" of this question. We have
read this case carefully and while the quoted portion from
the opinion in counsel's brief is correct, the case is not an
authority for the proposition claimed for by the plaintiff.
The second syllabus in the Pacific report of said case is very
accurate in stating the holding of the case. Said syllabus is,
as follows:
"Where a seller sued for the balance due on a contract, on the theory that he had performed the contract binding him to sell and deliver the amount
of ~heat he then 'had on hand, and the undisputed
evidence showed that he had on hand 2,163 bushels, and that he delivered only 1,1421/2 bushels, a
finding that the seller had fully performed his part
of the contract was unauthorized."
The plaintiff's brief, at Page 10, after discussing the
Neuberger Case, proceeds with a discussion of the letters
and state~, among other things, as follows: "Unless these
letters are calculated to have effected the termination of
'said Agreement-' the trial Court has made no conclusion
respecting them." If the Bill of Exceptions had been brought
to this Court by the plaintiff, it could be easily determined
that the Court concluded from all of the evidence, includ-
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ing the letters, that the. plaintiff had elected to terminate
.and did terminate said Agreement more than six years prior
to the commencement of this action.
Plaintiff's brief also states on page 11 thereof, as follows: "It must be noted that the plaintiff, alone, could terminate the contract prior to November 19, 1941, and then
only upon the happening of certain events." Pl~intiff did
elect to terminate and did terminate said contract prior to
1941 and more than six years prior to the commencement
of this action as found by the Court. If the plaintiff had
brought up the Bill of Exceptions, this matter could have
been determined by this court. In the absence of the Bill
of Exceptions, the finding must be against the plaintiff.
. A copy of the Agreement sued upon is attached to the
plaintiff's Complaint, (J. R. pp. 4-7). Said Agreement provides in part, as follows:
"14.-Th~s license shall be. for a period of ten (10)
years from the date hereof but may be sooner terminated by the Company upon the happening. of
any, of the following events:
·
·
... "The failure or refusal for a ·period of three
days to pay any sum or sums of money now or
hereafter due, by acceleration or otherwise, to be
paid hereunder by the Exhibitor, and in this respect time shall be of the essence." (J. R. p. 5).

The Findings of Fact state in part, as follows:
''(a) That said Agreement provides that Elsie Haas
Littlejohn and William Littlejohn pay to the plaintiff the sum of 'Fifty Dollars ($50.00) annually·
during the term of this license, the first payment
commencing one (.1) year from the date hereof';
that the date of said Agreement is the 19th day
of November, 1931; that the said Elsie Haas LitSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tlejohn and William Littlejohn and the defendants
herein have failed and neglected to pay to the
plaintiff said annual installments of Fifty Dollars
($50.00) each and have failed and neglected to pay
to the plaintiff any of said annual instalhnents."
(J. R. p. 4.5).
The first annual Fifty Dollar payment due from the decedents to the plaintiff became due on the 19th day of November, 1931. Said payment was not made. An additional
Fifty Dollar installment became due from the decedents to
the plaintiff yearly thereafter. None of said installments
were made. (J. R. p. 45). The plaintiff, three days after
the decedents failed to make the first payment, had the
right to terminate said Agreement. The Court in its Findings of Fact found that the plaintiff on July 9th, 1935;
August . 27, 1935; D-ecember 28, 1936; February 1, 1937;
April 30, 1937; August 7, 1937; November 16, 1937; April
6, 1938; May 26, 1938; July 14, 1938; October 12, 1938; June
9, 1939; September 25, 1939; November 13, 1939; January
10, 1940; February 17, 1940; July 31, 1940; December 2,
1940; January 30, 1941; July 16, 1942 and March 1, 1943
demanded of the decedents that they return sa~d phonofilm
and equipment to the plaintiff in New York City (J. R. p.
47). Under the terms and provisions of said Agreement,
the plaintiff had no right to the return to it of said phonofilm and equipment without it having elected to terminate
said Agreement. From the contents of said letters and the
ether evidence introduced before the lower Court, the Court
made the finding "that more than six years prior to the
commencement of this action, the plaintiff elected to terminate and did terminate said Agreement ~ - -'~, Finding 12,
(J. R .. p. 46) . This finding is one of an ultimate fact and
.
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can not be disturbed by the appellate Court on an appeal
vvhich is mer.ely on the Judgment Roll. The Court agreed
~rith the plaintiff that the plaintiff is the only one that had
the right to terminate said Agreement, but found that
the plaintiff had elected to terminate and did terminate
said Agreement more than six years prior to the commencement of this action. The plaintiff's example of a
Promissory Note payable to the plaintiff in annual installments over a period of ten years is not analogous to the
situation involved in the case at bar.
The plaintiff contends that in any event in this action
it is entitled to recover the last two Fifty Dollar annual
installments. We submit that after the plaintiff elected to
terminate said Agreement it could not collect any additional
annual installments.
32 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 875, states, as
follows:
"On the other hand, a forfeiture which the lessor
elects to assert terminates the lease and with it all
obligations, covenants, and stipulations in the lease
dependent upon the continuance of the term .
. Thus, as a general rule the lessee is relieved from
liability for subsequently accruing rents, in the
absence of a stipulation in the lease for his continued liability, and although. the lessee refuses
to surrender possession after a forfeiture, the lessor cannot recover rent subsequently falling due
while the lessee continues possession; his remedy
in such a case is an action for damages for the
lessee's wrongfully withholding possession."
The Agreement between the parties also provides in
part, as follows:
"18-Upon the expiration or sooner termination of
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this license for any reason whatsoever or the
abandonment by the Exhibitor of the Theatre
- - - - - -, the Exhibitor, at its own cost and expense, shall surrender and deliver up possession
of the Equipment to the Company at its factory
in good order and condition, reasonable wear and
tear excepted, - - - - -:- -" (J. R.. p. 6).
Plaintiff states at page 13 of its brief discussing this
matter, as follo·w·s: "Apparently the defendants and the
trial court take the view that such abandonment did terminate the agreement". Plaintiff argues that the decedents
could not terminate their obligation under said Agreement
by abandoning the Lyric Theatre and that it would take
some affirmative act on the part of the plaintiff to terminate said Agreement after the abandonment. The plaintiff
misunderstands the Agreement. The Agreement provides
that the decedents could not use said equipment any place
except in the Lyric Theatre in Price, Utah, and that if they
abandoned the Lyric Theatre they, at their own expense,
"shall surrender and deliver up possession of the equipment to the Company at its factory in good order and
condition, - - - - -". The dec.edents,, upon abandoning the
Lyric Theatre in the year 1937, became immediately obliged to ship said equipment to the plaintiff at its factory in
New York City. The Agreement does not provide that the
decedents could not abandon the Lyric Theatre, but provides only that if they did they shall return said equipment to the plaintiff. The decedents did not breach the
Agreement by abandoning the Lyric Theatre, but did
breach the Agreement in 1937 when they did not immediately after abandoning said Theatre. return said equipment
to the plaintiff.
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Plaintiff argues that it has not been shown that the
plaintiff knew that. the decedents abandoned the Lyric
Theatre and therefore the Statute of Limitations did not
start to run until the plaintiff learned of said fact. The
Utah case of Dee vs. Hyland et al., 3 Utah 308, 3 Pac. 388,
136 A. L. R. 659, holds that the statutes of limitations begin to run from the time of the commission of the wrongful
act, or when the right of action accrues, and not from the
time of the knowledge of the act by the plaintiff. The Dee
Case
is a leading case on the . subject and has been cited with
.
approval by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Grisson et
al vs. Beidleman et al., 129 P. 853; by the Supreme Court of
Oregon in Hume v. Burns et al., 83· P. 391, al).d has also
been cited with approval by other courts.
The California Case of Rose vs. Dunk-Harbison Company, et al., 46 P. 2nd 242, reading from page 243 states:
"As a rule, statutes of limitation commence to
run when a cause of action is complete. There are
well-recognized exceptions to the rule. But the fact
that the injured party is without knowledge of the
wrong committed, while bringing a case within the
exceptions gener~lly recognized in cases of fraud
and fraudulent concealment of facts, does not
generally toll.the statute. A cause of action is not
suspended merely because a party is ignorant of
the fact that he has a cause of action or of
the identity of the one who committed a certain
act.· Lightner· Mining Co. vs. Lane, 161 Cal. 689,
120 P. 771, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1093; Lambert vs.
McKenzie, 135 Cal. 100, 67 P. 6; Medley vs. Hill,
104 Cal. App. 309, 285 P. 891."
The general rule: is also stated in ah annotation in 136
A. L. R. 658.
In the light of the above authorities, we believe the
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law to be as follows:
1. That 'vhen "the plaintiff elected to terminate and
did terminate said Agreemen.t", more than six years prior
to the commencement of this action, that its cause of action
accrued and the statutes of limitation immediately started
to run.
2. The statutes of limitation began to run on each of
the Fifty 'Dollar installment payments when each of the
same became due. None became due during the period
more than six years immediately prior to the commencement of the action because the plaintiff had terminated
the Agreement and could not thereafter recover the rental
installments ,as stated in the citation from 32 Am. Jur.,
Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 875, above quoted.
3. In addition to the above matters, upon the abandonment of the Lyric Theatre in 1937, the decedents became immediately obliged under the Agreement to return
the equipment to the plaintiff. Decedents did not do so
and a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff accrued at
said time, both for the recovery of the possession of said
equipment and for any damages suffered by the plaintiff.
for the decedents' breach. In any event, the statutes of
limitation had commenced to run against the plaintiff's
cause of action at the time the plaintiff "elected to termi.;.
nate and did terminate said Agreement" more than six
years prior to the commencement of this action. This
action was not commenced by the plaintiff until May 24th,
1945.
4. As above stated, in any event the Court has found
that the plaintiff elected to terminate and did terminate its
Agreement more than six years prior to the filing of its
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Complaint and the finding is unassailable because the appeal is .on the Judgment Roll, and this court cannot review
the evidence.
Plaintiff cannot recover in this case because its Complaint does not state a cause of action.
It is to be noted that the obligation of the decedents
was to return the equipment to the plaintiff after the
termination · of the said Agreement. Plaintiff does not
bring this action to recover the possession of said equipment. It brings the action for the sum of Three Thousand
Dollars which it claims was the value of said equipment in
the year 1941 at the end of the ten year period at which
time the contract would have expired by its own terms
had nothing else occurred in the meantime. We submit that the plaintiff's only action is for the recovery of
the possession of the property. The only cause of action
that the plaintiff had was for the recovery of the property, or in the event recovery of the property could not be
had, then for its value. The Complaint does not set forth
a cause of action for the recovery of the property, and in
the event that recovery cannot be had, then for its value.
Plaintiff claims that when decedents did not return said
property to the pl~intiff that the plaintiff had the right to
bring an action for the value of the property. This is not
the law. Counsel for plaintiff apparently believes that the
decedents and the defendants were guilty of a conversion
of said property merely by not returning the same to the
plaintiff.
I

"Mere detention of another's chattels which
rightfully came into one's possession is not an actionable conversion unle~ss based upon a negation
of the owner's rights or acco:rppanied by an attempt
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to convert the property to the holder's own use."
- - - - - - "Demand and refusal are necessary for
the maintenance of an action for conversion, in
all cases in which defendant was rightfully in possession." See Fletcher vs. Pump Creek Gas and
Oil Syndicate 38 Wyo. 329; 266 P. 1062; 61 A.
L. R. 615.
We wish to point out to the Court that there are no allegations in the plaintiff's Complaint covering these matters.
The general rule of law on the subject is given in an
annotation in 61 A. L. R. 621. It is as follows:
"Generally speaking, where one is lawfully in possession of the goods or chattels of another, and a
demand on him for the delivery of the goods or
chattels is made by or on behalf of the true owner,
his mere detention of the property or failure or
neglect to make delivery, without the performance
of any express or affirmative act of conversion,
does not amount to a conversion."
The plaintiff does not state a cause of action . in
trover or conversion because it does not plead any acts of
decedents or defendants amounting to a conversion. There
is no allegation in plaintiff's Complaint of the performance
by the decedents or defendants of any express or affirma...
tive act of conversion.

A caus·e of action is not stated against the defendants in this case _because of their inability to deliver said
property to the plaintiff. S.ee annotation in 61 A. L. R. 628
under the subject Inability to deliver. It states in part, as
follows:
"It is likewise held in cases in which one has been
lawfully in possession of chattels, but is no longer
in possession, due to no act of conversion on his
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part, that a mere failure to deliver after a demand
by or on behalf of the true owner is not such a detention as will constitute a conversion."
See Supplemental Annotation in_ 129 A. L. R. 638 on the
subject of "Mere detention of or· failure to deliver chattels
after demand as conversion."
See also:Watkins vs. Jensen, 58 Utah 13, 197 P. 222;
Nielsen vs .. Hyland, 51 Utah 334, 170 P. 778.
In conclusion, we wish to state that the failure of the
plaintiff to file a proper claim with the representatives of
decedents by its failing to attach a copy of the contract to
the purported claims presented is determinative of this
case, and precludes plaintiff from any recovery herein. In
addition to this point, we believe that the law on the balance
of the case is also conclusively against the plaintiff. ·For
the reasons hereinabove stated, the judgment of the lower
court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
DART & SHEYA
Attorneys for James Cochran Littlejohn
RUGGERI & GIBSON
Attorneys for Naida L. Hyatt
· Respondents.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

